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The Dual Capacity Doctrine in Products Liability
Cases in Pennsylvania
I. INTRODUCTION
The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act' limits an em-
ployer's liability for injuries to employees arising out of and related
to the course of employment" exclusively to the remedies provided
under the Act.' The purpose of the workers' compensation scheme
is to eliminate notions of fault by allowing the employee to recover
under the statute, with the quid pro quo of limited liability on the
part of the employer.4
The "dual capacity doctrine" seeks to enable an employee to re-
cover against his or her employer beyond the scope of a workers'
compensation statute by reaching the employer in an alternative
capacity in which he owes a duty of care to the general public. The
doctrine has been employed by several courts to find an employer,
who is also a manufacturer of a defective product, liable to an em-
ployee, who is also a foreseeable consumer who is injured by the
product.3 In products liability cases, and in other types of cases
adopting a similar rationale, the emphasis is not on the employer-
employee relationship, but rather on some other type of relation-
ship existing between the two, such as the manufacturer-consumer
relationship, where liability may be considered as separate from
the employer's limited liability under workers' compensation.e
A second, more narrow application of the dual capacity doctrine
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-1534 (Purdon 1952 & Supp. 1982-1983). See infra note
84.
2. Id. § 411(1). In Pennsylvania, attempts by an employee to hold an employer liable
beyond workers' compensation have generally failed. Wagner v. National Indem. Co., 492
Pa. 154, 422 A.2d 1061 (1980) (employer liability to employee killed during course of em-
ployment limited to Act, where additional damages were sought under Pennsylvania's no-
fault motor vehicle insurance Act).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983). The remedies under the
Act (e.g., compensation, reimbursement of insurers) are contained in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77,
§ 411-467 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
4. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.11 (1982).
5. Id. § 72.81. See also Note, Dual Capacity Doctrine: Third Party Liability of Em-
ployer-Manufacturer in Products Liability Litigation, 12 IND. L. REv. 553 (1979).
6. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 72.81. See also Douglas v. E.&J. Gallo Winery, 69
Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977); Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279,
361 N.E.2d 492 (1976).
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seeks to find in the employer a separate and distinct legal identity
upon which liability can be predicated for breach of a duty of care
which corresponds with the alternate persona. This theory of dual
capacity focuses strictly upon a definite legal identity which exists
in addition to that of "employer," such as that of a trustee, land-
owner, or lessor, rather than upon broadly defined relationships
existing between an employer and employee.7 This rationale results
in a more limited exception to workers' compensation exclusivity
provisions, and is less readily applied in the products liability area.
The exclusive- remedy provisions of workers' compensation stat-
utes which govern employer-employee relationships are in contrast
to the expanded remedies available in tort actions by consumers
against manufacturers.8 Any attempted reconciliation of workers'
compensation and dual capacity will pose a difficult task to courts
which try to accommodate the equity of allowing recovery against
a manufacturer of a defective product by a foreseeable user, even if
the user is an employee, and the usually explicit exclusivity provi-
sions of workers' compensation statutes.
This comment will explore the development of the dual capacity
doctrine in the United States. It will then discuss Pennsylvania
cases addressing the issue of employee recovery beyond the limits
of workers' compensation, with an emphasis on such recovery in
the area of products liability. The dual capacity doctrine's treat-
ment in Pennsylvania will be explored, first by looking at cases de-
cided in federal district courts in Pennsylvania and then by analyz-
ing a recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in relation to
analogous decisions in the products liability area. Criticisms of
dual capacity will be addressed, followed by a conclusion favoring
acceptance of the doctrine in Pennsylvania in products liability
cases.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DuAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE
To date, three states' courts have resolved the workers' compen-
7. Sharp v. Gallagher, 94 Ill. App. 3d 1128, 419 N.E.2d 443 (1981). See infra notes 48-
60 and accompanying text.
8. Note, supra note 5, at 553, 555 (citing Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Third
Party's Action Over Against Employer, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 351 (1970)). See also Malone, The
Limits of Coverage in Workmen's Compensation - The Dual Requirement Reappraised,
51 N.C.L. REv. 705 (1973); O'Connell, Workmen's Compensation as a Sole Remedy for Em-
ployees But Not Employers, 28 LAB. L.J. 287 (1977). See also Mitchell, Products Liability,
Workmen's Compensation and the Industrial Accident, 14 DUQ. L. REv. 349 (1976); Com-
ment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Suability: The Dual Capacity Doctrine, 5
ST. MARY'S L.J. 818 (1974).
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sation/dual capacity dilemma in favor of allowing dual capacity re-
covery: Ohio,9 California, 0 and Illinois.1 All other states have ei-
ther not adopted or not addressed the question. 2 Of those courts
9. Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1976).
10. Douglas v. E.&J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
11. Sharp v. Gallagher, 94 I1. App. 3d 1128, 419 N.E.2d 443 (1981). See 2A A. LARSON,
supra note 4, §§ 72.81-.83 (Supp. 1982).
12. Id. The following state courts have addressed the dual capacity doctrine and re-
jected it: Mapson v. Montgomery White Trucks, Inc., 357 So. 2d 971 (Ala. 1978) (no dual
capacity for employee injured when truck employer sold customer, and which employee was
fixing, rolled onto employee; employer not in dual capacity as employer and vendor); Vine-
yard v. Southwest Eng'g & Contracting, 117 Ariz. 52, 570 P.2d 823 (1977) (workers' compen-
sation benefits are exclusive recovery for employee injured in industrial accident even if
collective bargaining agreement provided for safety devices to be installed by employer and
they were not installed); Needham v. Fred's Frozen Foods, Inc., 171 Ind. App. 671, 359
N.E.2d 544 (1977) (workers' compensation recovery exclusive in cases where plaintiff-em-
ployee was burned over 40% of body when employer-manufactured pressure cooker ex-
ploded; up to'legislature to so alter workmens' compensation; court did not address issue if
product sold to public); Atchison v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 360 So. 2d 599 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1389 (La. 1978) (employee who lost leg by employer-manu-
factured machine was limited to workers' compensation; court rejects employee's products
liability argument); Noland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 97 Nev. 268, 628 P.2d 1123 (1981)
(employee sues subcontractor-employer as manufacturer and vendor of elevator that caused
injury, but court held that where Nevada statute treats subcontractors and their employees
as employees of principal contractor, subcontractor has contractor's immunity to suit be-
yond workers' compensation statute); Cohn v. Spinks Indus. Inc., 602 S.W.2d 102 (TeL Civ.
App. 1980) (widow sues decedent's employer under dual capacity, as lessor of defective heli-
copter; court held remedy limited to workers' compensation even though employer buys
helicopters to lease to general public; up to legislature to change workers' compensation
exclusivity); Gerger v. Campbell, 98 Wis. 2d 282, 297 N.W.2d 183 (1980) (no dual capacity
recovery where president of company negligently modified machine which injured employee,
because he did so as employer, and not as owner or lessor of machine; court did not address
issue of whether product was for sale to the public; court did not reject dual capacity totally,
only on facts of case).
In Kentucky and Massachusetts, the courts refused to allow employer liability beyond
workers' compensation where an employer's separate division manufactured a product that
injured employee; the courts did not totally reject the possible application of dual capacity
in other factual situations. Borman v. Interlake, Inc., 623 S.W.2d 912 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981)
(employer-manufacturer of steel coil that caused death of employee of separate division was
not liable under dual capacity; under different facts, doctrine might apply, if new duties of
employer gave rise to a distinct legal persona); Longever v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 80
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1767, 408 N.E.2d 857 (1980) (where employee was injured by employer-
manufactured product which was sold to public, the court declined to follow Ohio and Cali-
fornia by adopting the dual capacity doctrine, leaving it up to the legislature to alter work-
ers' compensation exclusive recovery; court left issue open whether doctrine might be war-
ranted under some circumstances).
In New Hampshire and North Dakota, the dual capacity doctrine was rejected, but in
cases where the defective product was not sold to the general public, thereby distinguishing
Douglas v. E.&J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977), which
adopted the doctrine in California for products sold to the general public. See DePaolo v.
Spaulding Fibre Co., 119 N.H. 89, 397 A.2d 1048 (1979); Latendresse v. Preskey, 290
N.W.2d 267 (N.D. 1980). Considering this "sold to the public" caveat, it is possible these
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which have rejected the dual capacity doctrine, the opinion of the
Court of Appeals of Michigan in Peoples v. Chrysler Corp.'s is ex-
emplary. In Peoples, an employee was injured while operating an
employer-manufactured machine.14 The court affirmed the lower
court's summary judgment for the employer1 5 despite the em-
ployee's argument that the dual capacity doctrine should apply
and that the product in question had been manufactured by the
employer and sold to the public." The Peoples court distinguished
a case17 allowing a common law cause of action to an employee who
sustained an injury from eating food bought in the employer's caf-
eteria, even though workers' compensation benefits were also al-
lowed, because in Peoples the employer-employee relationship was
not merely incidental to the cause of action."8 Rather, the em-
ployee in Peoples was injured while. using a machine in his capac-
ity as an employee; the use of the product was a routine and inte-
gral part of the employment.' 9 The court concluded that it would
pose an end-run around the exclusivity provision of the workers'
compensation statute that could invalidate the intent of the legis-
lature when it created the workers' compensation system."0
Only recently have the courts begun to make inroads regarding
the rule of strict application of workers' compensation exclusivity
two states could adopt the doctrine should a case arise where the injury to the employee is
caused by an employer-manufactured product that is for sale to the public.
In applying the appropriate state's laws, the following federal courts have rejected the
dual capacity doctrine: Mott v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 636 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1981) (injured
employee who tries to reach manufacturer-employer beyond workers' compensation under
the dual capacity doctrine is limited to workers' compensation; the Texas Supreme Court
had refused to consider further appeal in an analogous case, so it was unlikely Texas would
accept dual capacity); Kottis v. United States Steel Corp., 543 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1976) (court
limits injured employee's recovery to workers' compensation, where employee argued dual
capacity of employer as owner of land and as manufacturer of defective product; court
found the employment relationship was dominant, and it was up to Indiana state courts to
make such inroads on the workers' compensation scheme, not a federal court sitting in
diversity).
13. 98 Mich. App. 277, 296 N.W.2d 237 (1980).
14. Id. at 278, 296 N.W.2d at 238.
15. Id. at 283-84, 296 N.W.2d at 240-41.
16. Id.
17. Panagos v. North Detroit General Hosp., 35 Mich. App. 554, 192 N.W.2d 542
(1971). In Panagos, an employee injured her mouth on a foreign object in a piece of pie
bought in the hospital cafeteria. The Panagos court allowed suit against the hospital under
negligence and breach of warranty, because the plaintiff's cause of action was not based on
the employment relationship, but on the vendor-vendee relationship. Id. at 558-59, 192
N.W.2d at 544.





provisions. The Ohio Court of Appeals for Ottawa County recog-
nized the dual capacity doctrine in Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc." In
Mercer, the plaintiff was injured while in a truck when an em-
ployer-manufactured tire blew out, causing a collision.22 The plain-
tiff argued that the court below erred in granting summary judg-
ment to the employer, because the products liability action did not
arise out of the employer-employee relationship.23 The employee
presented two arguments, both of which were accepted by the
court: that the employee was not suing as an employee injured as
the result of his employment, but as a reasonably foreseeable user
injured by a defective product, and, that the employer acted in a
second capacity which confers obligations independent of an em-
ployer's obligations. 4 The Mercer court stated that the hazard was
not necessarily one of employment, but one common to the public
in general.25 The court reasoned that when the cause of injury is
not a hazard of employment, there is no causal connection between
employment and injury.2" The court also stated that since it was
only circumstance that the tire was manufactured by the employer,
the employee's second assignment of error, based on the dual ca-
pacity doctrine, was well-taken.2 7 An opinion partially concurring
and partially dissenting agreed with the majority in its scope of
employment discussion, 8 but disagreed with the majority's recog-
nition of the dual capacity doctrine, arguing that the Ohio workers'
compensation statute's exclusivity language should bar any accept-
21. 49 Ohio App. 2d 275, 285, 361 N.E.2d 492, 496 (1977).
22. Id. at 280, 361 N.E.2d at 493.
23. Id. at 281-82, 361 N.E.2d at 494-95.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 285, 361 N.E.2d at 496. Cf. Knous v. Ridge Machine Co., 64 Ohio App. 2d
251, 413 N.E.2d 1218 (1980), where the dual capacity doctrine was held inapplicable where
the employer/manufacturer's defective machine caused the death of an employee, because
the machine was for the use of its own employees, and not for the general public. See 2A A.
LARSON, supra note 4, § 72.83, at 14-245 n.23.
26. 49 Ohio App. 2d at 285, 361 N.E.2d at 496.
27. Id. The Mercer court said:
It was only a matter of circumstance that the tire on the truck in which the plaintiff
was riding was a Uniroyal tire rather than a Sears, Goodyear, or Goodrich. In recent
years, corporations and employers have entered a variety of fields and economic fac-
tors have promoted diversification rather than specialization. Conglomerates have be-
come the rule. A corporation's economic structure should not dictate the right of the
injured to recover or that each new corporate merger erases a like number of causes
of action.
49 Ohio App. 2d at 285-86, 361 N.E.2d at 496 (footnotes omitted).
28. Id. at 286, 361 N.E.2d at 497 (Wiley, J., concurring and dissenting).
1983 999
Duquesne Law Review
ance of the doctrine by the courts."
California adopted the dual capacity doctrine in the area of
products liability in Douglas v. E.&J. Gallo Winery.30 The issue in
Douglas was whether employer liability existed beyond workers'
compensation for injuries incurred by an employee in the course of
employment, in the use of a product manufactured and sold to the
public by the employer."1 The employee was injured when em-
ployer-manufactured scaffolding collapsed.3 2 The California Court
of Appeal held that the employee may state a cause of action based
on manufacturer's liability even though the manufacturer is also
the employer and the injuries took place during the course of em-
ployment."3 The court required the product manufactured by the
employer be for sale to the public, rather than for the sole use of
the employer." The opinion emphasized that the focus should be
on a defendant's responsibilities for his own acts where a different
duty to take care arises other than duties imposed on an em-
ployer.38 The court stated that an employer has workers' compen-
sation immunity, but if he engages in the dual capacity of manu-
facture for sale to the public, the employer assumes all of the
duties of a manufacturer." The court justified this reasoning by
29. Id. at 286, 361 N.E.2d at 498 (Wiley, J., concurring and dissenting). The Ohio
workmen's compensation statute provides in pertinent part:
Employers... shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by stat-
ute for any injury... received... by any employee in the course of or arising out of
his employment, or for any death resulting from such injury ... occurring during the
period covered by such premium so paid into the state insurance fund, or during the
interval of time in which such employer is permitted to pay such compensation di-
rectly to his injured employees ....
OHfo REv. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1978).
30. 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
31. Id. at 106, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 107, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 107-08, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
36. Id. at 110, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 801. The California Workers' Compensation Act pro-
vides in pertinent part:
Liability for compensation... shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an
employer for any injury sustained by his employees arising out of and in the course of
employment . . . in those cases where the following conditions of compensation
concur:
(b) Where, at the time of the injury, the employee is performing service growing
out of and incidental to his employment and is acting within the course of his
employment,




stating that it was not the result of legalistic machination, but ac-
ceptance of the long recognized doctrine that every person is a
bundle of rights, liabilities, and immunities.37 Although an em-
ployee assumes the risks of employment, he does not give up his
rights as a user against a manufacturer."
. The Douglas rationale regarding the dual capacity doctrine was
recently upheld by the California Supreme Court in Bell v. Indus-
trial Vangas, Inc.,3" where an employee sued the manufacturer-
employer and a customer because he was injured in a fire while
delivering gas.40 Mr. Bell alleged that his employer and the cus-
tomer were in the business of manufacturing, purchasing, testing,
and inspecting the defective products which proximately caused'
his injuries.42 The Bell court carefully reviewed the long line of
California cases accepting the dual capacity doctrine, as well as the
Ohio case, Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc.,48 in concluding that the doc-
trine was valid and applicable to Mr. Bell.
Although both Ohio and California have accepted the dual ca-
pacity doctrine, their justifications for permitting employee recov-
ery are not identical. In holding that the employee had stated a
cognizable products liability cause of action against his employer
in Mercer, the Ohio court looked to both course of employment
and the dual capacity of the employer's relationship to the em-
ployee." California, on the other hand, predicated the employee's
cause of action in Douglas on policy reasons based solely on the
CAL. LABOR CODE § 3600 (West 1978) (emphasis added).
The clause "proximately caused" of the above excerpt from the California Labor Code
is not present in the analogous Ohio, Illinois, or Pennsylvania workers' compensation statute
sections. See supra note 29; infra notes 54, 84.
See Morena v. Leslie's Pool Mart, 110 Cal. App. 3d 179, 167 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1980) (dual
capacity applicable where plaintiff-employee injured by fumes of unlabelled chemical bot-
tles manufactured by a different division of employer's firm). The dual capacity doctrine is
not applicable where product is not for sale to the public. Shook v. Jacuzzi, 59 Cal. App. 3d
978, 129 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1976); Williams v. State Compensation Ins. Fund, 50 Cal. App. 3d
116, 123 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1975).
37. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 110, 137 CaL Rptr. at 801.
38. Id. at 111, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
39. 30 Cal. 3d 268, 637 P.2d 266, 179 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1981) (en banc).
40. Id. at 270, 637 P.2d at 267, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 31.
41. See supra note 36.
42. 30 Cal. 3d at 271, 637 P.2d at 268, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 32.
43. 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1976). See supra notes 21-29 and accompa-
nying text.
44. 30 Cal. 3d at 278, 637 P.2d at 272-73, 179 CaL Rptr. at 37.
45. 49 Ohio App. 2d at 281-86, 361 N.E.2d at 494-96.
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employer's dual capacity obligations to the employee." However,
when applying the dual capacity rationale, both states' courts re-
quire that the product in question be sold to the public to whom
the usual duty of care is owed.
4 7
The dual capacity doctrine has also been accepted in Illinois.
However, the Illinois test for dual capacity differs from that of Cal-
ifornia and Ohio. While the latter jurisdictions apply the doctrine
by focusing upon the duty of care owed by the employer to the
general public in order to determine dual capacity, the Illinois
courts apply dual capacity only where the employer possesses a
recognized separate legal identity. In Sharp v. Gallagher,48 the em-
ployee was allowed to recover beyond the limits of workers' com-
pensation when employer-manufactured scaffolding on employer-
owned property caused the employee's injury.49 In Sharp, the ap-
pellate court of Illinois relied on the reasoning of similar Illinois
precedents, Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater
Chicago,50 and Marcus v. Green.51 The Sharp court discussed
Smith, which held that the duty of the owner in charge of work,
under the Illinois Structural Work Act," is entirely separate from
the duty of the employer." In Smith, Illinois accepted the dual
capacity doctrine by imposing liability beyond the workers' com-
pensation statute" on a member of a joint venture who also leased
trucks to the joint venture, one of which trucks proved defective
and injured an employee of the joint venture." The Smith court
found the employer in a dual capacity as a lessor, and therefore
liable beyond workers' compensation."
46. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 107-08, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
47. 49 Ohio App. 2d at 285, 371 N.E.2d at 496; 69 Cal. App. 3d at 107, 137 Cal. Rptr.
at 799.
48. 94 Ill. App. 3d 1128, 419 N.E.2d 443 (1981).
49. Id. at 1136, 419 N.E.2d at 449.
50. 77 Ill. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979).
51. 13 Ill. App. 3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (1973).
52. Structural Work Act § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 60 (Smith-Hurd 1969).
53. 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1135, 419 N.E.2d at 448.
54. 77 Ill. 2d at 319, 396 N.E.2d at 527. The Illinois workmen's compensation statute
provides in pertinent part:
No common law or statutory right to recover damages from the employer ... for
injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as
such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any em-
ployee who is covered by the provisions of this Act ....
Workmen's Compensation Act § 5, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-
1983).
55. 77 Ill. 2d at 319, 396 N.E.2d at 527.
56. Smith set out the Illinois test for applying dual capacity:
1002 Vol. 21:995
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The Sharp court also relied on Marcus in concluding that the
duty of a landowner to one who comes upon his land to transact
business is to exercise reasonable care for the visitor's safety while
he is on the premises.57 In Marcus, the employer was also found to
be in a dual capacity and therefore liable to the injured employee
beyond workers' compensation, in his role as the owner of land on
which the employee was injured. 8
In relying on Smith and Marcus, the Sharp court emphasized
the dual capacity of an employer as owner of land in charge of
work as the justification for application of the doctrine.59 The
Sharp court did not specifically address the issue of whether the
scaffolding was sold by the employer to the general public, but
based its acceptance on the Illinois precedents Smith and Mar-
cus. s0 The broader policies behind the California cases accepting
dual capacity were not addressed in Sharp. Consequently, it ap-
pears that Illinois will continue to adhere to the more narrow "sep-
arate legal identity" test in applying the dual capacity doctrine.
III. THE DuAL CAPACITY DOCTRINE IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. Going Beyond Workers' Compensation Exclusivity
The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act provides recov-
[A]n employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive remedy principle
may become liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his ca-
pacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on him obligations independent of
those imposed on him as employer .... The decisive test ... is not concerned with
how separate or different the second function of the employer is . . . but with
whether the second function generates obligations unrelated to those flowing from the
first, that of the employer.
Id. at 318-19, 396 N.E. 2d at 527. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 72.81 at 14-229.
57. 94 Il. App. 3d at 1135, 419 N.E.2d at 448-49.
58. 13 Ill. App. 3d at 704, 300 N.E.2d at 516. In Marcus the employee was a carpenter
who was injured when scaffolding collapsed. He sued the owners of land on which the build-
ing was being constructed, one of which owners was the sole owner of the business engaged
in the construction of the building. Id. at 701, 300 N.E.2d at 513-14. The court allowed the
employee to sue the employer as an owner of land under the Structural Work Act, because
the employer was in a different legal capacity as a land owner. Id. at 707, 300 N.E.2d at 518.
"[Ilt would produce a harsh and incongruous result to distinguish between liability to em-
ployees injured under precisely the same circumstances simply because some worked on
property owned by their employers and others worked on property owned by third parties."
Id. at 708, 300 N.E.2d at 518.
59. 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1136, 419 N.E.2d at 449. This emphasis on finding a true dual
capacity role of the employer, without considering whether the product injuring the em-
ployee was for sale to the public, is a different approach from that of Ohio and California.
See supra notes 25, 31 and accompanying text.
60. 94 Ill. App. 3d at 1135-36, 419 N.E.2d at 448-49.
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ery to an employee for injuries which arise in the course of employ-
ment and which are related thereto."1 Recovery for such injuries
under the Act is exclusive.6 2 In Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board v. Ayres Philadelphia, Inc.,6s the claimant's husband suf-
fered a heart attack while at work, and the court found it to be a
compensable injury because there was a direct connection between
the decedent's work and his heart attack.6 ' The court concluded
that the injury arose in the course of employment.
6 5
When employees attempt to impose employer liability beyond
the limits of workers' compensation, Pennsylvania courts have
been reluctant to do so, even where the employer's conduct is reck-
less, wanton, and in disregard of the safety of others.66 In Ulicny v.
National Dust Collector Corp.,67 the wife of a decedent-employee
sued her husband's employer alleging other employees caused a
steel cover of the dust collecting system to close in on her husband,
crushing him to death. 8 The plaintiff argued that the employer's
conduct went beyond ordinary negligence and was "reckless and
wanton conduct in disregard of the safety of others."' 9 The district
court, in applying Pennsylvania law, refused to lift the employer's
immunity under the workers' compensation statute.7 0 Recovery
was limited to workers' compensation, in a strict construction of
61. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. v. Ayres Philadelphia, Inc., 23 Pa. Commw.
249, 351 A.2d 306 (1976), aff'd, 479 Pa. 286, 388 A.2d 659 (1978). The 1972 amendments to
the Act make it unnecessary for claimants to prove the existence of a compensable "acci-
dent." Id.
62. The general rule in Pennsylvania is that the remedy under workers' compensation
is exclusive; an employer tortfeasor's maximum tort liability is limited to the amount availa-
ble under workers' compensation. Hamler v. Waldron, 445 Pa. 262, 284 A.2d 725 (1971);
Steets v. Sovereign Const. Co., 413 Pa. 458, 198 A.2d 590 (1964); Hyzy v. Pittsburgh Coal
Co., 384 Pa. 316, 121 A.2d 85 (1956); Sylvester v. Peruso, 286 Pa. Super. 225, 428 A.2d 653
(1981); Mitchell v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 281 Pa. Super. 452, 422 A.2d 556 (1980); Temple
v. Able Tool Co., 240 Pa. Super. 609, 359 A.2d 412 (1976); Greer v. United States Steel
Corp., 237 Pa. Super. 597, 352 A.2d 450 (1975), rev'd on other grounds, 475 Pa. 448, 380
A.2d 1221 (1977). See infra note 84.
63. 23 Pa. Commw. 249, 351 A.2d 303 (1976), afl'd, 479 Pa. 286, 388 A.2d 659 (1978).
64. Id. at 252, 351 A.2d at 307-08.
65. Id.
66. Ulicny v. National Dust Collector Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1265 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1266.
69. Id. at 1267.
70. Id. But see Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134, 191 A.2d 694 (1963) where
the intentional tort exception to workers' compensation exclusivity was allowed; the em-
ployer physically assaulted his employee and such a tort was held to not be an "accident"




the workers' compensation Act.7 1
In Evans v. Allentown Portland Cement Co.,72 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint because the employer's willful and unlawful violation of
safety regulations in removing safety guards on a conveyor system,
which resulted in the death of the employee, did not constitute an
intentional tort actionable outside the worker's compensation
Act. 7" A deliberate intent by the employer to injure the employee
is necessary to state a cause of action beyond workers' compensa-
tion .7 This deliberate intent to injure an employee was found in
Sumski v. Sauquoit Silk Co.,7 where the employer fraudulently
had the employee use a toxic chemical agent.7" Sumski was criti-
cized, however, in Tysenn v. Johns-Manville Corp.,7 where the
federal district court sitting in diversity and applying Pennsylvania
law, ruled the intentional tort exception to workers' compensation
liability was unacceptable.7
8
Tysenn concerned the controversial asbestosis issue, making the
case factually distinguishable from Sumski.79 In a recent asbestosis
action by employees seeking to recover from the employer-manu-
facturer beyond workers' compensation, Neal v. Carey Canadian
Mines, Ltd.,80 the employer failed to put warning labels on asbes-
tos products regarding the hazards of exposure to asbestos.8' The
district court applied Pennsylvania law and after examining case
law including Sumski and Ulicny, found there was sufficient evi-
dence for a jury to find the employer's actions constituted a delib-
erate intention by the employer to harm the employees."2 If a jury
found deliberate intent to harm the employees, the employer
would be liable for damages beyond workers' compensation.83
Ulicny, Evans, and Tysenn reveal the general reluctance of
71. 391 F. Supp. at 1267.
72. 433 Pa. 595, 252 A.2d 646 (1969).
73. 433 Pa. at 598, 252 A.2d at 648.
74. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 379 (E.D. Pa. 1982). See
infra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
75. 66 Lackawanna Jurist 118 (C.P. Lackawanna County Pa. 1965).
76. Id. at 123.
77. 517 F. Supp. 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
78. Id. at 1293.
79. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
80. 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
81. Id. at 366.
82. Id. at 381. Evans and Ulicny were also recently upheld by the Third Circuit in
Weldon v. Celotex Corp., 695 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1982).
83. 548 F. Supp. 357, 381 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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Pennsylvania state courts and federal courts applying Pennsylva-
nia law to go beyond the exclusivity provision of the workers' com-
pensation Act.8 4 Neal indicates a shift toward imposing broader
employer liability beyond workers' compensation, but, as Tysenn,
may be limited to the controversial asbestosis issue.
B. Will Pennsylvania Adopt Dual Capacity?
The dual capacity doctrine in employer-as-manufacturer prod-
ucts liability cases underwent interesting treatment in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in
Kohr v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. (Kohr I)85 and Kohr v. Ray-
bestos-Manahattan, Inc. (Kohr II). 8' Kohr I involved a products
liability action by employees or their representatives for damages
caused by exposure to asbestos produced by the employer.8 7 In
Kohr I, the court stated that an employer could be held liable be-
yond workers' compensation as a manufacturer under the dual ca-
pacity doctrine," unless the employer could show it manufactured
the product solely for its own use.8 The workers' compensation
statute was held not to be a bar to tort recovery against the em-
ployer when acting in the role of manufacturer of asbestos prod-
ucts.90 The court relied on the opinion of the United States Su-
preme Court in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore,91 in arguing
that the purpose behind workers' compensation liability is based
84. See supra notes 66-73, 77-78 and accompanying text. The Pennsylvania Work-
men's Compensation Act provides in pertinent part:
The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and
all other liability to such employees ... in any action at law or otherwise on account
of any injury or death as defined in section 301(c)(1) and (2) or occupational disease
as defined in section 108.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983).
Sections 301(c)(1) and (2) and § 108 are in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 27.1 (Purdon Supp.
1982-1983), which exclusively lists the occupational diseases under the Pennsylvania Work-
men's Compensation Act, e.g., § 27.2(k) silicosis; § 27.2(t) asbestosis.
85. 505 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
86. 522 F. Supp. 1070 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
87. Id. at 1071.
88. 505 F. Supp. at 161.
89. Id. See Knous v. Ridge Machine Co., 64 Ohio App. 2d 251, 413 N.E.2d 1218 (1980).
See supra note 25. See also supra note 36.
90. 505 F. Supp. at 160.
91. 263 U.S. 418 (1923) (employee killed right outside place of employ while crossing
railroad track on way to work; Court held that since crossing the track was the only method
to reach the plant the accident was within the course of employement and the employer was
liable for workers' compensation).
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on the employer-employee relationship.2 The Kohr I court stated
that because an employer as a manufacturer is not within this rela-
tionship, a workers' compensation statute would be no defense to
common law liability.98
The Kohr I court reasoned that allowing exclusive workers' com-
pensation liability in cases where a manufacturer's product had in-
jured an employee would permit the tortfeasor to use workers'
compensation as a shield against products liability negligence" and
relieve a manufacturer-employer of liability because of the "chance
circumstance" that the manufacturer is also the employer.e5 The
Kohr I court also relied on Pennsylvania's acceptance of section
402 A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts," which allows strict
liability for injuries caused by defective products, and concluded
that section 402 A should not be abrogated by the "fortuity of an
employment relationship."'97 The court stated that as a federal
court sitting in diversity, it had to try to predict what state law
would be since Pennsylvania courts had not addressed the issue.9'
In light of the purposes of workers' compensation statutes" and
Pennsylvania's adoption of section 402 A,100 the court predicted
92. 505 F. Supp. at 161. See also 1 A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 2.10.
93. 505 F. Supp. at 161. "Although an employee may be deemed to have accepted
employment conditions, including workmen's compensation, to conclude that he also waived
his right to bring a products liability action against a negligent manufacturer who coinciden-
tally happens to be his employer would be unfair and unrealistic." Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The court observed that exclusive workers' compensation liability here would
be against the basic principle of imposing ultimate liability for negligence on the person
responsible for it. Id.
96. RTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
97. 505 F. Supp. at 162.
98. Id.,
99. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
100. Pennsylvania adopted § 402 A of the RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS in Webb
v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966).
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Pennsylvania courts would adopt dual capacity. 0 1 In so predicting,
Kohr I relied on Douglas v. E.&J. Gallo Winery'0 and Mercer v.
Uniroyal, Inc.10 No Pennsylvania state court precedents were
cited. 04
In Kohr II, a four-judge panel rejected the Kohr I analysis'05
and held that it was the role of a federal court sitting in diversity
to apply current state law, thus refusing to apply the dual capacity
doctrine in Pennsylvania.'e The court observed that the Pennsyl-
vania Workmen's Compensation Act provided the exclusive liabil-
ity of employers10 7 and stated that the court should follow the
"plain meaning" of the statute. 08 In an area of the law where state
courts have not spoken, the Kohr II court maintained that federal
courts in diversity can only predict, not form, state law, and cannot
ignore a statute's "plain meaning" "merely in order to effectuate a
judicially created legal theory which seeks to expand a manufac-
turer's liability."'' The court conceded the basic appeal and eq-
uity behind the dual capacity doctrine," 0 but ruled that any
change in the exclusivity provision of the Pennsylvania Workmen's
Compensation Act must come from the state legislature or the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court."'
A recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Tatrai v. Presbyte-
rian University Hospital,"' may be some indication of the likeli-
hood of acceptance of the dual capacity doctrine in Pennsylvania.
Tatrai is not a products liability case, but is one that allowed an
employee to establish the liability of an employer-hospital, as a
101. 505 F. Supp. at 162. The court also relied on what it believed was the majority
rule among the other states; this mistaken view was corrected in Kohr Ii, 522 F. Supp. 1070,
1077, n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
102. 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977).
103. 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 361 N.E.2d 492 (1976).
104. 505 F. Supp. at 161.
105. 522 F. Supp. at 1075-76.
106. Id. at 1075. "Federal courts sitting in diversity cases must ascertain and apply
state law." Id. at 1074 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
107. 522 F. Supp. at 1075. See supra note 84.
108. 522 F. Supp. at 1074.
109. Id. at 1075-76.
110. Id. at 1076.
111. Id. Judge Troutman, who decided Kohr I, filed a concurring opinion in Kohr I,
reversing Kohr L Id. at 1076-77. Thus, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was fully be-
hind the Kohr H decision.
112. 497 Pa. 247, 439 A.2d 1162 (Pa. 1982). Justice Nix wrote the opinion reversing the
Pennsylvania Superior Court; Justice Roberts wrote an opinion in which Chief Justice
O'Brien and Justices Larsen and Flaherty joined. Justices Wilkinson and Kauffman did not
participate in the case. Id. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166.
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provider of medical services, beyond workers' compensation. "3
In Tatrai, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed an order
limiting the plaintiff-nurse's recovery of workers' compensation.
1 4
Ms. Tatrai became ill while at work at the defendant-hospital and
was told by her supervisor to go to the hospital emergency room
for x-rays.'1 " She was injured when the x-ray stand collapsed, caus-
ing her to fall and injure her foot."' The majority held that since
the employee was injured in the emergency room, which the hospi-
tal held out to the public as providing medical services, the work-
ers' compensation Act was not a bar to the employee's common law
action.
1 1 7
Justice Roberts stated for the majority that, contrary to the view
of Justice Nix,1 18 whether the injury arose in the course of employ-
ment was not the issue in this case.1 9 The only relevant fact, as he
saw it, was that Ms. Tatrai was injured in the emergency room
which was open to the general public.1 20 Ms. Tatrai was exposed to
the same risks as any other paying member of the public, and the
majority concluded that she was entitled to the same degree of
care in treatment. 21 The fact that Ms. Tatrai had received treat-
ment at a hospital at which she was employed at the time of the
injury was no reason to distinguish her from any other patient.
1 "2
Justice Roberts quoted the California and Ohio cases, D'Angona v.
County of Los Angeles"" and Guy v. Arthur H. Thomas Co. 1 4 in
stating that where an injury that arises from a relationship inde-
pendent of that of employer-employee, and involves a different set
of obligations from employers' obligations, there is no reason to
shield the employer from common law liability.'" He stated that
only "blind adherence" to the workers' compensation Act language
- an act designed to help, not hinder employees in pursuit of ben-
efits - could deprive Ms. Tatrai of the opportunity to proceed on
113. Id. For a general discussion of Tatrai, see 21 DuQ. L. Rxv. 563 (1983).
114. 497 Pa. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166 (Nix, J.).
115. Id. at 249, 439 A.2d at 1163 (Nix. J.).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166-67 (Roberts, J.).
118. See infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text.
119. 497 Pa. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166 (Roberts, J.).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 255-56, 439 A.2d at 1166 (Roberts, J.).
123. 27 Cal. 3d 661, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980).
124. 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978).
125. 497 Pa. at 256, 439 A.2d at 1166-67 (Roberts. J.).
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her cause of action.126
Justice Nix, in his separate opinion, also allowed the employee
her common law action, but limited his rationale to a finding that
the injury occurred beyond the scope of her employment. 12 7 He de-
scribed two types of injury which arise in the course of employ-
ment: those occurring while the employee is furthering the em-
ployer's business, and those occurring on the employer's
premises. 128 Justice Nix rejected the hospital's contention that the
employee was injured in furtherance of the employer's business be-
cause it is too tenuous a benefit to the employer to ensure the
health of hospital employees. 12 9 The primary purpose of treatment
here was for the employee's own benefit.130 Justice Nix found that
the treatment given Ms. Tatrai was totally extraneous to the em-
ployment scheme.131 He stated that her illness interrupted her em-
ployment activities and rendered her incapable of continuing
them.13 2 Even though the employee was paid for the time she was
being treated, Justice Nix reasoned that this was inconclusive as to
the issue of furthering the hospital's business, because she proba-
bly would have been paid if she had gone elsewhere for treat-
ment." He also noted that the hospital billed Blue Cross for her
treatment, as it would have for any member of the general
public.
13 4
Regarding the second type of injury, that occurring on the em-
ployer's premises, Justice Nix found that the employee's presence
on the employer's premises at the time of injury was only fortui-
tous." 5 Her presence in the emergency room was not to further her
employer's business, and was not required by her employment, and
Justice Nix concluded, she was not limited to workers'
compensation. 136
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Tatrai evidences
a disagreement on the court over the relevant issue behind al-
126. Id. at 257, 439 A.2d at 1167 (Roberts, J.) (quoting Reed v. The Yaka, 373 U.S.
410, 415 (1963).
127. 497 Pa. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166 (Nix, J.).
128. Id. at 251, 439 A.2d at 1164 (Nix, J.).
129. Id. at 252, 439 A.2d at 1164 (Nix, J.).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 252, 439 A.2d at 1165 (Nix, J.).
132. Id. at 253, 439 A.2d at 1165 (Nix, J.).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 253-54, 439 A.2d at 1165-66 (Nix, J.).
136. Id. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166 (Nix, J.).
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lowing the employee her common law action. Justice Nix allowed
her suit based on his interpretation of "course of employment,"
while Justice Roberts for the majority recognized a second capacity
in the employer which subjected it to suit.187 These two views of
employer liability were discussed by the Ohio Court of Appeals for
Ottawa County in Mercer v. Uniroyal, Inc.3 8 The Mercer court
held that the employee should have an opportunity to establish a
cause of action based on products liability because the activity was
beyond the scope of employment, and that the employer-manufac-
turer acted in a second capacity that conferred obligations inde-
pendent of an employer.3 9 The concurrence/dissent in Mercer
agreed with the majority's view on scope of employment, but
would not have recognized the dual capacity of the employer. 40 In
Tatrai, the majority recognized only the dual capacity, while Jus-
tice Nix would have limited the holding to scope of employment. 4'
The Ohio Supreme Court also recognized the dual capacity doc-
trine in a hospital services case similar to Tatrai, Guy v. Arthur H.
Thomas Co. 14 2 The Guy court recognized the dual capacity of the
hospital-employer which conferred obligations independent from
its obligations as employer. 43 The Guy court relied on the Califor-
nia case Duprey v. Shane,144 where the California Court of Appeal
recognized the doctrine where a doctor-employer bore two inde-
pendent relationships and obligations toward the employee-
patient.
4
A parallel situation to the Ohio cases of Mercer and Guy arose in
California in Douglas v. E.&J. Gallo Winery 46 and D'Angona v.
County of Los Angeles.147 In D'Angona, the California Supreme
Court allowed a hospital employee to reach the employer beyond
workers' compensation because of aggravation of injuries in the
137. See supra notes 118-36 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
139. 49 Ohio App. 2d at 282-86, 361 N.E.2d at 494-96. See supra note 27 and accom-
panying text.
140. 49 Ohio App. 2d at 289-90, 361 N.E.2d at 498-99. See supra notes 28-29 and
accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 125, 136 and accompanying text.
142. 55 Ohio St. 2d 183, 378 N.E.2d 488 (1978).
143. Id. 378 N.E.2d at 488.
144. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
145. Id. at 793, 249 P.2d at 15-16.
146. 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977). See supra notes 30-38 and accom-
panying text.
147. 27 Cal. 3d 661, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980).
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hospital emergency room. " 8 In reasoning similar to that of Tatrai,
the D'Angona court emphasized that the hospital was open to the
public, and in causing the employee's injury it was not acting in its
capacity as employer, but as a hospital with corresponding obliga-
tions to a patient.1 4 ' As in Ohio, California has accepted the dual
capacity doctrine in both products liability cases (Douglas) and
hospital services cases (D'Angona).
The reasoning of the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Tatrai, in allowing a common law suit against the hospi-
tal, is very similar to the language used by the California and Ohio
courts in accepting the dual capacity doctrine in products liability
cases. For example, the Tatrai court stated, regarding Ms. Tatrai's
injury in the emergency room: "In holding itself out to the public
as a provider of medical services. . . [the] hospital owed a duty to
all its patients. There is no basis for distinguishing [Ms. Tatrai], a
paying customer, from any other member of the public injured
during the course of treatment. 1 50 The court in the Ohio case,
Mercer, said it was "only a matter of circumstance 1 51 that the tire
that injured the employee was manufactured by his employer.15 2 In
the California case, Douglas, the fact that the employer-manufac-
tured product was sold to the public exposed the employer to dual
capacity treatment.58
In his dissent in the Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in
Tatrai,15' Judge Hoffman cited D'Angona v. County of Los Ange-
les, in arguing that the workers' compensation Act should not be
Ms. Tatrai's exclusive remedy, because the hospital held itself out
to the public as a provider of medical services, and occupied a dif-
ferent role with subsequent new duties.1 55 Judge Hoffman's dissent
pointed out that the employee's presence in the hospital emer-
gency room was not in furtherance of the employer's business, was
not required by the terms of employment, and that the employee
was charged for services.1 5 ' These points formed a large part of the
rationale of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its reversal of the
148. Id. at 669, 613 P.2d at 244, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
149. Id.
150. 497 Pa. at 255, 439 A.2d at 1166 (Roberts, J.).
151. 49 Ohio App. 2d at 285, 361 N.E.2d at 496. See supra note 27.
152. Id.
153. 69 Cal. App. 3d at 107, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 799.
154. 284 Pa. Super. 300, 306, 425 A.2d 823, 826 (1981) (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 308-09, 425 A.2d at 827 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 313, 425 A.2d at 829 (Hoffman, J., dissenting).
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superior court. 5 "
Tatrai is an indication that Pennsylvania may accept the dual
capacity doctrine in products liability cases, where it is clear that a
"product," even in the form of health services, is sold to the public.
This would put Pennsylvania in accord with Ohio and California in
recognizing-the dual capacity of employers as manufacturers, re-
garding products which injure employees and are also for sale to
the public. 58 There appears to be no reason for treating a product
for sale to the public differently from medical services held out to
the public.
There are, however, commentators who strongly urge restraint in
imposing liability on employers beyond workers' compensation. In
his treatise, 5 9 Professor Larson disputes the usefulness of the term
"dual capacity"'"6 and prefers the term "dual persona."'' Larson
explains this by stating that a typical third party statute usually
defines a third party as "a person other than the employer," not as
"a person acting in a capacity other than that of employer."' 62 He
argues that only in exceptional circumstances should even this
"dual persona" concept be utilized. 6' Professor Larson questions
the propriety of imposing the dual capacity doctrine in any but the
most limited areas, and would apply it only in cases in which the
employer has a distinct and separate second legal identity, "
whether the case is products liability or otherwise.' 6 ' For example,
Larson lists as an instance of an already recognized legal duality in
persona, a trustee who is also the owner of his own business.' 66
Larson argues that the issue is not one of activity or relationship,
157. See supra text accompanying notes 119-26.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27, 33.
159. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 4.
160. Id. § 72.81, at 14-230.
161. Id.
162. Id. § 72.81, at 14-230 to -231.
163. Id. § 72.81, at 14-234.
164. Id. § 72.81, at 14-229.
165. Id. § 72.83 at 14-245. Professor Larson states:
[E]ven under the most permissive definition of dual capacity, the Ohio and California
cases cannot be justified. .. . The employer has a duty as employer to provide safe
scaffolding; he has a duty as manufacturer to make safe scaffolding; if he makes un-
safe scaffolding and provides it to his employee to be used in his work, the two obliga-
tions are braided together so tightly they cannot possibly be separated. ... [S]ince
the machine was used to aid the employer's business, construction of the machine was
auxiliary to business.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (referring to Goetz v. Avildsen Tool and Mach., Inc., 82 Iln. App. 3d
1054, 403 N.E.2d 555 (1980)).
166. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 72.81, at 14-232.
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but of identity.' e7 The employer is always an employer,168 and the
only way to break through this fact is by use of legal fiction.160
Larson asserts that other dualities should only be created
statutorily.'
7 0
In Tatrai, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court allowed dual recov-
ery against the hospital-employer.17 ' Professor Larson accepts ap-
plication of the dual capacity doctrine only in those limited cases
in which the employer is in the business of furnishing medical ser-
vices, and the responsibility for malpractice is personal, not vicari-
ous. '7 Such a case of personal liability is the California case of
Duprey v. Shane,178 where the employer-chiropractor negligently
treated his employee; the California Court of Appeal held that the
dual capacity doctrine applied.' 7 4 The doctrine, according to Lar-
son, should not be extended to hospital emergency room cases,
such as D'Angona v. County of Los Angeles.175 Professor Larson
criticizes D'Angona arguing that there is a great difference be-
tween Duprey, where the injury was personally caused by the doc-
tor-employer, and D'Angona, where the California Supreme Court
held the hospital had obligations to the employee-patient indepen-
dent from its obligations as employer.' 76 Professor Larson also dis-
putes the validity of the rationale used by the Illinois courts in
accepting the dual capacity doctrine in cases where the employer is
the owner of land on which the injury occurred. 17 7 Larson contends
mere ownership of land does not endow a person with a second
legal persona. 78 Furthermore, he argues that for practical reasons,
an employer, as part of his business will usually own or occupy the
premises, and if every function connected with maintaining the
premises could ground a tort suit, exclusivity provisions in work-
167. Id. § 72.81, at 14-231.
168. Id. (quoting with approval Tennessee Supreme Court in McAlister v. Methodist
Hosp., 550 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. 1977); "The employer is the employer; not some other
person other than the employer. It is that simple.").
169. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 72.81, at 14-231.
170. Id. § 72.81, at 14-232.
171. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
172. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 72.61(c), at 14-209.
173. 39 Cal. 2d 781, 249 P.2d 8 (1952).
174. Id. at 793, 249 P.2d at 15-16.
175. 27 Cal. 3d 681, 613 P.2d 238, 166 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1980). See 2A A. LARSON, supra
note 4, § 72.61(c), at 14-209 to -210.
176. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 4, § 72.61(c), at 14-209 to -210.




ers' compensation statutes "would be reduced to a shambles.' 1 79
IV. CONCLUSION
In spite of the criticisms of Professor Larson of the dual capacity
doctrine, it appears likely to be accepted in Pennsylvania in prod-
ucts liability cases. The Ohio and California hospital services deci-
sions accepting the doctrine, Guy and D'Angona, are similar to Ta-
trai in rationale and result. 8 ' The majority in Tatrai quoted both
cases in recognizing the dual capacity of the hospital-employer.181
The policies and rationale of Guy and D'Angona which were
quoted with approval by the Tatrai majority are the same policies
expressed in the products liability cases accepting dual capacity,
Mercer in Ohio and Douglas in California."8' A recognition that the
employer assumed a second, independent capacity with obligations
separate from its obligations as employer was a common thread in
Mercer, Guy, D'Angona, Douglas, and Tatrai.1 83 This recognition
of a second capacity of the employer, combined with a holding out
by the employer to the general public, established the dual capac-
ity doctrine in D'Angona, Douglas, and Tatrai.18' There is a cross-
over in policy justifications for acceptance of the doctrine in prod-
ucts liability cases and hospital services cases in Ohio and Califor-
nia, and it is likely, after Tatrai, that Pennsylvania will follow suit
in products liability cases. The reasoning behind acceptance is
sound: It is not unfair to strip the employer of workers' compensa-
tion immunity if he acts in a capacity other than that of an em-
ployer. If the doctrine is not applied to such cases, the fortuitous
circumstance of being a manufacturer's employee will inequitably
restrict an injured user of a defective product from pursuing a
cause of action in the expanding area of products liability.
Patricia C. Perry
179. Id. Larson also rejects application of the dual capacity doctrine in the area of
owner or charterer of a vessel. Id. § 72.84.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 142-49.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 123-25.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 21-38.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 21-38, 123-25, 142-49.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35, 149-50.
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